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ARGUl\1ENT

The trial court incorrectly granted Mr. Lindsey's motion for summary judgment
awarding him not only his premarital interest in the business, but also all of the
$7,324,000 in appreciation of the business during the 19 year marriage. The trial court
made this award in spite of Ms. Lindsey's contributions to the business and family life.
Specifically, the trial court awarded Ms. Lindsey $566,527 in assets, while awarding Mr.
Lindsey $10,524,138 million in assets. The trial court minimized and disregarded :Ms.
Lindsey's efforts and contributions, misapplied the facts on summary judgment and at
trial 1, depriving her of the interest she earned in the business during the marriage.
Moreover, in spite of the requirement in any property division "that the ultimate
division be equitable," Henshai.,v v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ,1s, Ms. Lindsey was
awarded only 5.2% of value compared to Mr. Lindsey's $10,524,138 award. The trial
court misapplied the facts to Utah law on equity, to Ms. Lindsey's prejudice.
The arguments made in Mr. Lindsey's brief do not change the fact that the trial
court incorrectly applied facts to Utah law, and failed to make an equitable division of
1

The trial court found that "no new evidence \vas presented at trial warranting
reconsideration of the summary judgment." [R.1782.] In other words, evidence presented
at trial was considered and rejected by the trial court as impacting its ruling on summary
judgment. This is consistent with Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure providing
that "any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as
to any of the claims or parties, and may be changed at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." Utah
R. Civ. P. 54(b). As such, evidence at trial may be considered as part of the analysis as to
whether the summary judgment ruling was correct.
I
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property.

I. On summary judgment the trial court improperly denied M.s. Lindsey her
interest in a portion of the appreciation of l\1r. Lindsey's business which she
acquired through her contributions to the business and the family during the
marriage.

In his brief !\1r. Lindsey correctly notes that one spouse's separate property may be
properly distributed to the other, if ·'the other spouse has by his or her efforts contributed
to Lh.e enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an
equitable interest." A1ortensen v..~1ortensen, 760 P.2d 304,308 (Utah 1988). However,
the clarification of .i\1ortensen in Jensen is not as clear as Mr. LL.'t}dsey argues.
Specifically, :Mr. Lindsey argues that "in order to qualify under the contribution category
of Mortensen," "'active participation and contribution by the nonowner spouse" "is
required." [Appellee's Brief at p. 19.] Ho\\rever, :Mr. Lindsey omits that this Court stated
that "Afortensen, Dunn, and Elman appear to require more active participation and
contribution by the nonowner spouse [than caring for the parties' child, maintaining the
household, and running her ovm part-time business from their home as the facts in Jensen
state] in order to qualify under the contribution theory of .~1ortensen." Jensen v. Jensen,
2009 UT App. 1~

~

14 (underline added). If the standard ,vere as clear as 1'1r. Lindsey

argues, this Court would not have included the words "appear to" in its recitation and
clarification of the law.
This distinction is important because it reflects this Court's intentionally loose and
flexible interpretation of the contribution theory given ho\\' liberal the standard was in the
2
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l 980s 2 as compared to how the standard has morphed in more recent cases such as

Jensen. In Jensen, the wife "did not assist in running the business or contribute in any
way to its increase in equity," and ,vas not a,·varded an interest in the separate property.

Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App. 1, ~ 16. However, in this case Ms. Lindsey contributed
to the business ( as discussed in greater detail below) so she exceeds the wife's failure to
contribute to the business "in any way" in Jensen. Similarly, Ms. Lindsey's efforts
exceed the wife's efforts in Kunzler which were limited to "domestic labors enabl[ing]
Husband to ranch for longer periods of time without having to, for example, return home
to launder his clothes." Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263, ~19.
As set forth in Ms. Lindsey's original brief, her actions and contributions fall
somewhere between the extreme contribution case of Ebnan and the solely domestic
contribution case of Kunzler. However, the trial court improperly minimized Ms.
Lindsey's efforts and incorrectly applied the facts to Utah law on summary judgment and
at trial.

Mr. Lindsey also overreaches and misstates undisputed facts in his brief. For
example, Mr. Lindsey claims Ms. Lindsey "admitted she had no involvement with [Mr.
Lindsey's] insurance business prior to or during the marriage ... [and that] she had no

2

See, e.g., Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah 1983) (holding that the trial
court's property distribution-granting the wife forty percent of the value of the
husband's company-was within its allotted discretion, in part, "while it is true that the
[wife] took no responsibility for the business, it was her assumption of domestic burdens
which made possible the [husband's] full-time participation in the business.").
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knO\vledge of ... business operations ... [and that :Ms. Lindsey] admitted she ,,,as not
involved in any business related discussions with [:Mr. Lindsey]." [Appellee's Brief at p.
23.] Rather, the undisputed facts are that l\1s. Lindsey ,,,as inYolved in the business to the
extent she hosted various business associates and clients~ and she "had little knowledge
[but not "'no kno,·dedge''] of the operations of the business ... [and] did not speak
extensively [but she did speak] with :Mr. Lindsey regarding his businesses .... " [R.122427.] !\1s. Lindsey was also involved in planning, building, and maintaining of the Heber
residence (used to entertain business clients and associates) and involved in the
acquisition of the helicopter (used for the business). [R.1881 :79-80, 1882:44-45.]
More specifically ,vith respect to hosting business associates and clients, l\1r.
Lindsey misstates the undisputed facts when he clain1S that Ms. Lindsey "ente1tained six
of [:Mr. Lindsey's] business associates on seven occasions over the seventeen years .... "
[Appellee's Brief at p. 23.] Rather, the undisputed and unrefuted facts are thaLMs.
Lindsey claimed ··she entertained business associates, clients, potential employees, and
potential clients during the ... maniage numerous times to further :Mr. Lindsey's
business without being paid. She specifically testified [at the time of summary judgment]
of hosting six different business associates and their families ..." [R.1226-27.] The
unpaid hosting :Ms. Lindsey could recall included:

1. Mr. Sheehey (from Lloyd's of London) visited nvice \\rith his family of five for
extended periods. Each visit :Ms. Lindsey provided a hostess basket, maps, event

4

information, and clean sheets. The Sheeheys stayed at the Lindsey residence, as
well as the business houseboat at Lake Po\\1ell. Ms. Lindsey cooked meals,
cleaned up, and aided in laundry. \1/hen Mr. Lindsey was at work, Ms. Lindsey
entertained the Sheehey family. Ms. Lindsey provided transportation to such
events as a rodeo, concert, and sporting event. Mr. Sheehey also stayed at the
parties' residence on a trip without his family on another occasion. [R.1226.]
2. Charles Smith (from Lloyd's of London) "stayed numerous times at both the
Draper and Heber houses." Ms. Lindsey often cooked for :Mr. Smith and did his
laundry. Mr. Smith and his wife stayed at the Draper house and the parties took
them skiing and Ms. Lindsey cooked for them. [R.1225-26 (emphasis added).]
3. Paul Daley (from Lloyd's of London) and his family of five stayed and were
hosted in the Heber residence. Mr. Lindsey ,:vas not even in town during the
beginning of the visit. Ms. Lindsey provided hostess baskets, cooked numerous
meals, cleaned up after them, and entertained them. Ms. Lindsey's car was loaned
to the Dales for a week. [R.1225.]
4. James (a river runner insurance client) stayed with his son at the Draper residence.
Ms. Lindsey provided meals and other services to them. The same client was
hosted another time (but not at the parties' residence). [R.1224-25.]

5
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5. J.T. Lemon (a river runner insurance client) v"as hosted on at least t\vo occasions,
once at the Heber residence and another time at the Draper residence. !\1s. Lindsey
also entertained him. [R.1224.]

6. Frank Lukas (a river runner insurance client) was hosted at the Heber residence
and :Ms. Lindsey entertained. [R.1224.]
7. In addition~ at trial :Ms. Lindsey recollected that she had hosted Justin Tweety and

he stayed at the parties' residence and she cleaned up after him and entertained
him. [R.1881 :80-8 l .]
Also at trial Ms. Lindsey's unrefuted testimony was that part of Mr. Lindsey's job
\ \1

as to retain clients, and part of retaining clients is entertaining them, taking care of

them, and making them happy. [R.1882:77.] Ms. Lindsey's unrefuted testimony ,·vas that
she facilitated and participated in that process, but she was never paid. [R.1882:77-78.]
The above is evidence Ms. Lindsey hosted, fed, entertained, and cleaned up after
seven (not six) business associates/clients, plus their families (two \J;lith five family
members). In addition, contrary to :Mr. Lindsey's claims of only hosting seven times, the
undisputed facts are that the hosting occurred on "numerous" occasions, sometimes for
extended periods of time. [R.1224-27.] For example, some stays were for 10 days and
over holidays. [R.1882:91.]
\Vhile Mr. Lindsey "stated that he alone \\70uld entertain clients at locations other
than the marital residence and at his ranch in Uintah County," [R.1224], it is undisputed
6

and unrefuted that Ms. Lindsey also entertained outside of the home. For example, she
hosted the Sheeheys in Lake Powell and at other events, like a rodeo, concert, and
sporting event, outside of the home. She also went skiing with the Smiths away from the
residence. [R.1225-26.]
Ms. Lindsey's "numerous" hosting of various business clients and associates is
evidence of providing services to the business without pay. :Mr. Lindsey tries to minimize
her efforts, but the undisputed facts speak for themselves. The law does not require a
non-owner spouse to be formally employed by the other spouse's business in order to
prove the non-owner spouse has "augmented" or "enhanced" business interests. For
example, the wife in Dunn performed unpaid services for the business but was found to
have an interest in the business. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P .2d 1314, 1318 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).

Mr. Lindsey argues there was no evidence Ms. Lindsey took on any "unusual" or
extraordinary responsibilities in the marriage that enhanced the value of the parties'
marital assets. However, during trial Mr. Lindsey testified regarding Ms. Lindsey's
significant influence and contributions. In addition to hosting business associates and
clients on "numerous" occasions, :Mr. Lindsey testified at trial 3 that he and Ms. Lindsey
were jointly involved in discussions and decisions related to acquiring the land and

3

Again, the parties' trial testimony made after the summary judgment ruling are relevant
to this appeal as the trial court found that "no new evidence was presented at trial
warranting reconsideration of the summary judgment." [R.1782.]
7
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building the Heber residence. [R.1881:78-79.] :Mr. Lindsey testified that he preferred a
different lot in \Vallsburg~ but Ms. Lindsey liked the Heber lot better. [R.1881 :79.] Mr.
Lindsey testified that :Ms. Lindsey was involved in the construction process, she reYiewed
building plans and made changes to them~ and they had ·'all kinds of discussions.~'
[R.1881 :79-80.] The home took just under t\vo vears to build (this \\,as not the typical
modest or uncomplicated residence-the home has thirteen air conditioners~ for
example). [R.1881:80-81, 1223-24.]
The parties spent nearly $7~000:000 to build the residence. [R.1881 :83 .] The home
is large (15,000 square feet-5,000 square feet is the helicopter hangar and garage), and
has a guest house, outdoor pool, game room, theater room, and many other rooms.
[R.1881 :88-89.] Ms. Lindsey had complete control over designing and decorating the
guest house (which, in addition to the main residence, was used to host and entertain
business associates). [R.1882:115-16.] :Ms. Lindsey assisted in maintaining the property
and made sure repairs were done and deliveries were made. [R. at 590-591, 1223-24.]
Ms. Lindsey's assistance with the building, furnishing, and maintaining the home, \\'hich
,.,vas used to host business associates and clients as ,vell as family, ,,,as ··unusual/' and
contributed to enhancing, maintaining, and protecting the business and the maiital assets.
Ms. Lindsey also contributed to the business and marriage in other \\1ays. !\1r.
Lindsey conceded at trial that Ms. Lindsey accompanied him on business trips both
domestic and international. [R.1881:97-100, 1816.] :Mr. Lindsey testified at tJ.ial that i\1s.
8
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Lindsey was involved in his helicopter acquisition, knew where :Mr. Lindsey went with
regard to the helicopter and what he was doing, and supported him buying it. [R.1882 :4445.] The helicopter had a marketing contract with lv1r. Lindsey's premarital business.
[R.1824; 1881 :62.] Ms. Lindsey also spent every other weekend for ten years at the
parties' ranch while the ranch buildings and improvements were being made during the
marriage. [R.1882:73; 1881 :61.] Mr. Lindsey testified that he used the family ranch to
take business associates in the helicopter to fish or otherwise entertain. [R.18 81: 61-62.]
Ms. Lindsey also testified she provided $54,000 of her separate money to iv1r. Lindsey for
"his work" and "work related use." [R.1881 :75-76.] Ms. Lindsey's stated intent with the
$54,000 was that it go towards the business, although at trial Mr. Lindsey claimed the
$54,000 was used for marital expenses (he testified "I know that they were spent on
marital expenses"), but shortly after he conceded there ,vas "no document or recollection
or specific evidence" that led him "to know for any degree of surety" "what happened to
the funds." [R.1882:249-50.]
Ms. Lindsey also undertook "unusual" responsibilities in the family. Ms.
Lindsey's unrefuted testimony was that she served Mr. Lindsey a home cooked meal
every night that was waiting for him when he got home, and she had all of his clothes laid
out every morning from the shirt to the socks. [R.1882:74.] She cared for the parties' son,
was always his primary caregiver, attended parent teacher conferences and doctor's
visits, did the laundry, assisted in student government campaigns, supported their son's
9
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religious choices, bought groceries, and so on. [R.1882:69-75.] She also cared for Mr.
Lindsey's

t\\'O

children from his prior marriage~ ··loved them like [her] own/' and

facilitated visitation every other weekend and every \Vednesday, and even allO\ved the
children to live \";vith the parties full time \\'hen they were 16 years old and were having
disputes ,;vith their mother. [R.1882:71-72.] :Ms. Lindsey provided unrefuted testimony
that she provided "[e]very ounce of the parenting" for her son and !vfr. Lindsey's children
from his prior man-iage, for all of the pai1ies' son's life and when :Mr. Lindsey's sons
,·vere four and six and continuing until the children became adults. [R.1882:71-72.]
Ms. Lindsey also supported ~1r. Lindsey during an extremely stressful time in his
life when the Heber residence was being built and there was difficulty ''"ith financing the
building of the home. [R.1881 :83-89.] ~1r. Lindsey testified at trial that due to the
financing difficulties, his ··world ,vas falling apart" and caused :Mr. Lindsey "physical
ailment.'' 4 [R.1881:88.] In fact, :Mr. Lindsey ,vas so emotional in recounting the event
from years prior that the tiial court allowed a recess for him to "collect" himself.
[R.1881 :87.] Ms. Lindsey supp011ed l\1r. Lindsey during this "unusual" time, ,vhich
benefitted the business and the family.
All of Ms. Lindsey's above "unusual" efforts augmented the value of the marital
assets, and l\1r. Lindsey's business. She enabled him to spend time a,vay from home to

4

:Mr. Lindsey's physical ailment was serious enough it was made part of the successful
lawsuit against Countly'\vide. [R.1881 :88.] The la,vsuit resulted in a $1,038)25 judgment
against Countr)'~Nide. [R.1776.]
10
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focus on business through her excellent homemaking. She entertained and hosted clients.
She assisted in decisions regarding extremely expensive acquisitions such as the
helicopter and Heber residence, both of which were used in part by the business. For
perspective, Mr. Lindsey's entire income during the marriage was $11,749)97, and the
parties spent $7,000,000 on building the residence. [R.1221, 1881 :83.] The residence was
unusual, as were Ms. Lindsey's contributions. i\1s. Lindsey intended $54,000 of her
separate money to go towards the business. She was the primary caregiver for the parties'
son and Mr. Lindsey's two children from his previous marriage. And i\1s. Lindsey cared
for Mr. Lindsey when his "world was falling apart" and suffering physically due to stress.
Ms. Lindsey contributed to the business sufficient to satisfy the contribution theory as her
actions show an "active participation with or contribution to" the gro\7\rth of Mr.
Lindsey's business. Ms. Lindsey went to great lengths to enhance, maintain, and protect
the business and the marital assets, many of which were intemvined (the business used
and benefited from the parties' residence, ranch, and helicopter). Ms. Lindsey's actions
entitle her to an equitable claim against a portion of the business, including appreciation.
Summary judgment should be reversed.

II.

The trial court's ruling on summary judgment precluded an equitable
division of the marital estate and misapplied legal precedent to the
prejudice of lVIs. Lindsey.
It is undisputed that in any property division, "[t]he overriding consideration is

that the ultimate division be equitable-that property be fairly divided between the
11
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parties~ given their contributions during the marriage and their circumstances at the time
of the divorce." HenshaH-' v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ,I15 (emphasis added). [R. at
1222.] It is also undisputed that '~[t]he court must consider whether there are any
extraordinary circumstances that warrant a departure from the presumptive mle." Id. [R.
at 1222.]
Regardless of v,.rhether Ms. Lindsey met the contribution standard (which she did),
the final balance of the property diYision (in a case '"rith no prenuptial agreement or
similar contract protecting separate assets or corresponding appreciation) resulted in a
drastic imbalance of equities. \"Vhile it is correct that

a11

equitable distribution "does not

need to be divided with strict mathematical equality," Christian v. Christian, 2014 UT
App 283, ~12, 341 P.3d 254, the final distribution was not even close to mathematical
equality. Ms. Lindsey was awarded only 5.2% of the value of:Mr. Lindsey's $10,524,138
award.
The trial court and :Mr. Lindsey focus on Elman for the position that a spouse
should be entitled to a reasonable rate of return on a premarital business before
quantifying or concluding that an increase in value during the maITiage is marital.
Ho,vever, Elman does not require that in every case a party should have a return on a
premarital asset, much less a 10% return. Rather~ this Cowi merely found based on the
unique facts, that the trial court equitably subtracted a reasonable rate of return to

12
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appropriately account for appreciation due to inflation. Ebnan v. Elman, 2002 UT App
83, ~~20, 29, 45 P.3d 176 .
.An extension of the trial court's and 11r. Lindsey's overly broad logic would have

this Court find that Elman requires a party with separate property to be entitled to no less
than a 10% return before any consideration of equitable division of the asset. Notably, the
10% rate in Elman was based on "[ e]vidence ... presented that California real property
values were increasing at 10% a year." Id. at ~34. Mr. Lindsey's logic places excessive
weight on the fact that his business ,:vas his separate property originally, while it nearly
quadrupled in value during the 19 year marriage.
Mr. Lindsey's argument (i.e., that bis right for a return automatically trumps any
of Ms. Lindsey's right to a return on the parties' largest asset) is not equity. While rate of
return is one factor to be considered in balancing equity, it cannot be the only factor to
consider. Mr. Lindsey argues that the Naranjo factors (i.e., the parties' health, their
standard of living and respective financial conditions, their needs and earning capacities,
the duration of the marriage, what the parties gave up by the marriage, and the
relationship the property division has with the amount of alimony awarded) do not need
to be considered. Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The

Naranjo factors are the type of factors that can infom1 the equities as to "whether there
are any extraordinary circumstances that warrant a departure from the presumptive rule."

Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ~15.
13
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Moreover and most importantly, all of the factors discussed in Section I above
showing Ms. Lindsey contributed to the business~ also cut in favor of a more balanced
division of property. l\1s. Lindsey's extraordinary contributions, as well as the
extraordinary facts of the case~ justify the equity exception.
Finally, under the equity exception, l\1r. Lindsey argues that :Ms. Lindsey's "small
contributions, at best" would have done :Ms. Lindsey "no good in the end." [Appellee's
Brief at p.30.] :Mr. Lindsey's labels of "small contributions" encompasses all the reasons
discussed in Section 1~ as \,·ell as the $54,000 (wruch at the time of trial would have been
worth $129,029 [R.1882: 186-87]) and the value of the 57 shares (,vhich issue was
foreclosed at summary judgment [R.1229-30]). It is easy for :Mr. Lindsey to minimize
Ms. Lindsey's financial and physical contributions to the business and marriage when he
was awarded $ I 0~524~ 13 8 in assets. However, simply taking into account :Ms. Lindsey's
$54,000 at the appreciated value would have increased the value of the assets awarded to
her by over 20%. The trial court should have applied the equity exception in order to do
justice.
CONCLUSION

Therefore, in light of the foregoing reasons and those contained in the Appellant's
original brief, :Ms. Lindsey respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District
Court's granting of summary judgment, find that l\1s. Lindsey is entitled to a portion of
the augmentation of l\1r. Lindsey's business interest during the marriage, and remand to
14

the District Court for a new trial wherein the amount of the business Ms. Lindsey is
awarded can be ascertained and where all other equities may be rebalanced in light of this
Court's ruling.
DATED this 16th day of May 2016.

DURH..4.M JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

Douglas B. Thayer
Mark R. Nelson
Attorneys for Appellant
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